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In fisheries, formal institutions are intentionally implemented to protect the stock of fish and to better adjust the 
fleet’s catch capacity to the resource base. The present study, however, explores how the same institutions also 
influence competitive forces that shape industry attractiveness and the profitability of fishing boats. The 
empirical context is a sample of Norwegian seagoing purse seiners during a period that saw the introduction of 
two different individual transferable quota (ITQ) variants, the so-called unit quota system (UQ) system and the 
structural quota (SQ) system. The study analyses and compares the profitability of the vessels before ITQs were 
implemented in Norway (1985–1995), then under the original UQ regime (1996–2004), and finally under the 
present SQ regime (2005–2018). The findings disclose that the average profit margin was 8.8% in the pre-quota 
period, 20.6% in the UQ period and 24.3% in the SQ period. The differences between the pre-quota period and 
the two quota periods were significant (p < 0.000), whereas the difference between the two different quota 
periods were not (p = 0.068). Thus, the findings of this study draw a picture of an economically thriving industry 
after the introduction of ITQs. The paper argues that the significant profitability improvements achieved is 
rooted in the institutions that are established, which provide the players with essentially free and protected 
access to a common and valuable fish resource. Finally, implications of the findings are discussed.   
1. Introduction 
In open unregulated fisheries, fish is a common property that 
everyone has the right to exploit [1,2]. Thus, a vessel owner will find it a 
rational strategy to increase his/her fishing effort as long as the catch 
profit accrued exceeds the costs of fishing [3]. Hence, if all boat owners 
follow their individual rationale, this will lead to overexploitation of the 
limited renewable natural resource. For this reason, individual rationale 
and collective rationale are in conflict [1,2]. One cause of the tragedy of 
the commons is that the costs of overfishing are shared with all other 
fishermen. Another reason is the absence of deliberate collective action 
to protect the stock of fish. As a consequence, institutional measures are 
required to make a fishery biologically and economically sustainable 
[17]. 
Norway manages its most important commercial fish resources, such 
as cod and mackerel, together with other countries. The Convention on 
the Law of the Sea obliges the coastal states to collaborate in managing 
shared fish stocks. It is the International Council for the Exploration of 
the Sea that gives advice on the total quota for shared species. The 
distribution of total allowable catch systems (TACs) between the nations 
is next agreed through annual negotiations between the countries 
involved. Hersoug [4] presented an institutional perspective of the 
Norwegian quota regime, which emerged in the wake of negotiations 
among different stakeholders such as the government, industry, and 
organizations. Strong institutions have thus been established to anchor 
fishery management to scientific stock assessments. Furthermore, the 
Norwegian Directorate of Fisheries monitors the technical development 
of the fishing fleet and carries out economic analyses of the entire 
Norwegian fishing fleet annually. Thus, Norwegian fisheries are 
managed by and through institutions [5–7]. The closures of the com-
mons, the introduction of TACs to protect the stock of fish, and the 
transferable vessels quota systems (first UQ, next SQ) to reduce over-
capacity and secure vessel profitability are all regulatory expressions of 
the fishery management policy implemented in Norway [8]. Once the 
fishery is closed and access to fish is limited, fishing is again expected to 
generate profit. 
As a general rule, only active fishermen can own fishing boats for 
commercial fishing in Norway (Participation Act, 1999). This is often 
referred to as the activity requirement and is a statutory requirement for 
a basic principle in Norwegian fisheries policy, which is to have a 
fishery-owned fishing fleet. Vertical integration is thus not allowed. A 
potential resource rent can then only accrue to the catch stage of the 
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value chain. 
Institutions are commonly known as the “rules of the game” [9]. The 
institutional economist Douglass North [10] defined institutions as “the 
humanly devised constraints that structure human interaction.” He 
further distinguished between formal institutions (law, regulations, and 
rules), which are the focus of this study, and informal institutions 
(norms, cultures, and ethics). The current literature have a remarkable 
consensus that institutions matter [11]. The present paper, however, 
aims to tackle the harder and more interesting issues of how the indi-
vidual transferable quota (ITQ) institution matters and to what extent it 
matters when it comes to profitability improvements of fishing vessels. 
The empirical context of this paper is therefore the Norwegian seagoing 
pelagic fishing fleet, which is subject to strict regulations. 
To explore the issues of profitability in this institutional context, the 
paper integrates two leading theoretical perspectives within strategic 
management: Porter’s [12,13] industry-based view of strategy; and Peng 
et al.’s [11] institution-based view of strategy (IBV). In this study, Porter 
is considered a complementary theoretical perspective to IBV. The paper 
contributes to the literature of strategic management in several ways. It 
enhances the understanding of how institutions matter in explaining the 
attractiveness of fishery industries and fishing boats’ long-term profit-
ability. Furthermore, the article attempts to accommodate the long- 
standing criticisms of lack of attention to the institutional context of 
the industry-based perspective [11]. Accordingly, the argumentation of 
this paper is illustrated by an economic analysis of longitudinal empir-
ical data of more than half of the population of seagoing purse seiners 
from ten years before the introduction of the first Norwegian ITQ variant 
in 1996. 
Moreover, to date, most research on IBV has been at the conceptual 
level, and empirical works have lagged behind [11]. In fact, few studies 
have convincingly shown why and to what extent institutional measures 
enhance industry attractiveness and profitability of firms. Furthermore, 
the majority of papers are applying IBV focus on non-developed and 
emerging economies, e.g., China and India [14]. As a consequence, only 
a part of the variation of the underlying dimensions of institutions is 
included. Selecting a fishery in a developed economy can help fill part of 
this absence of diversity in institutional contexts. This is hopefully 
another contribution of this study. The following research question (RQ) 
is raised in this paper: 
RQ: Is the profitability development of the Norwegian average 
seagoing purse seiner related to the implementation of the original UQ 
system and the later more liberal SQ system? 
The article proceeds as follows: Section 2 sets up the theoretical 
framework applied. Next, a description is provided of the institutional 
context of the Norwegian seagoing pelagic fishery. Thereafter, the 
research design, method, and data are presented before empirical find-
ings. The paper ends with a discussion of the findings. 
2. Theory 
The major perspectives on business strategy ultimately seek to 
answer the same question: What drives firm performance? According to 
the resource-based view of strategy, firm specific resources differentiate 
successful firms from failing ones, as it is the existence of valuable, rare, 
and hard-to-imitate resources that can largely explain performance 
variations among firms [15]. Porter, by contrast, claimed that an over-
riding strategic goal of a firm is to uncover and select an attractive in-
dustry. Thereafter, Porter suggests that the next strategic task is to 
establish a position that is less vulnerable relative to powerful forces 
within the industry chosen. Accordingly, it is the degree of competition 
as expressed by the more or less existence of five specific forces—threats 
from entrants and substitutes, powers of suppliers and buyers, and ri-
valry among competitors—that mostly influences firm performance 
[12,13]. Even though strategy research has for long paid attention to the 
impact of the business environment on firm performance, the research 
stream is criticized for ignoring context, history and the influence of 
institutions [16]. The interactions among institutions, organizations, 
and strategic choices have thus rarely been explored. Instead, a free 
market-based institutional framework has been taken for granted. 
Formal institutions as laws and regulations, and informal institutions as 
cultures and norms have been regarded as “background” only [11]. 
This inadequate attention to context, history, and institutions has 
called for new theoretical perspectives that can overcome the draw-
backs. The result is the emergence of the institution-based view (IBV) of 
strategy [11]. It is not solely firm resources or industry characteristics 
that can explain performance variations. IBV argues that in addition to 
industry- and firm-level conditions, institutions, should also be consid-
ered when aspiring to understand firm and industry performance. 
Extraordinary economic performance can also be due to vital institu-
tional forces that affect both the value of firm resources such as quotas 
and industry attractiveness such as an institutionally protected compe-
tition arena [17]. 
Furthermore, treating institutions as background conditions is 
insufficient for gaining a deeper understanding of strategic behavior and 
firms’ profit making in regulated fisheries [18,19]. When fisheries are 
managed sustainably, the supporting institutions are almost invisible. 
However, when fisheries are poorly managed, the absence of strong 
institutions is conspicuous [6,20]. Treating institutions as background 
or at best control variables [21] will not significantly advance strategy 
research on fisheries. The profound differences in institutional frame-
works between fisheries on one hand and free market industries on the 
other force scholars to pay more attention to institutional differences in 
addition to considering industry- and resource-based antecedents to 
performance variations [11,22]. 
2.1. Institution-based roots to profitability in fisheries 
There are several schools of thought within the institutional litera-
ture. Economists have predominantly focused on formal laws, rules, and 
regulations [23], whereas sociologists have paid more attention to 
informal aspects, such as cultures, norms, and values [24]. The present 
study focuses on the role of formal institutions on fishing vessels’ op-
portunities to make profit more in line with the view of institutional 
economists. Public policy and regulations can affect the overall attrac-
tiveness of an industry and the competitive forces and dynamics within 
it. Thus, abnormal profitability may be a result of a favorable institu-
tionally designed competition arena of a fishery. Although Porter’s five 
forces model did not explicitly acknowledge the role of government, he 
and others did note how government could influence a number of the 
forces by, for example, creating higher barriers to entry through 
Fig. 1. Institutional influences on a fishing industry’s attractiveness.  
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regulation or other means [17]. 
Fig. 1 illustrates the theoretical argument of this paper in the form of 
a tentative framework. The framework, which is inspired by Porter 
[12,13] and Peng et al. [11], indicates that formal institutions can 
significantly influence the competitive forces that shape the attractive-
ness of a fishing industry (also, see Table 1). 
This paper claims that formal institutions designed to make a fishery 
sustainable can severely affect industry attractiveness and thereby lay 
the foundation for extraordinary profit making of incumbent firms. A 
well-regulated fishery is in this regard defined as a fishery that is bio-
logically sustainable through TAC regulations and economically sus-
tainable for the actors through quota share regulations such as ITQs. 
According to Fig. 1, profitability of incumbent vessels are influenced by 
the biological and institutional environment that provide exclusive 
rights to harvest a common, valuable, fish resource for free. The tenta-
tive theoretical framework presented is a response to Peng et al.’s [11] 
and Bamberger’s [25] claim for a more formal inclusion of contextual 
factors such as institutions in existing models to further advance stra-
tegic management theories. 
2.1.1. Institutionally protecting the supply of fish: TAC regulations 
Ocean fish stocks have traditionally been regarded as common 
property resources. Gordon [1] demonstrated that unregulated fisheries 
lead to unprofitable overcapacity, depleted stocks and no profit for the 
actors. Hence, unregulated fisheries represent an inefficient adaptation. 
Formal institutions such as TAC regulations are needed to avoid over-
exploitation of the fish stocks and prevent socioeconomic waste [2,26]. 
Without TAC regulations, the industry’s supply of fish will be at risk. 
2.1.2. Institutionally curbing the race to fish: ITQ regulations 
TACs without further regulations would create a race to fish as each 
fisherman would maximize his/her own share of the TAC [27]. How-
ever, when government implements catch shares, a fisher has nothing to 
gain by spending excessive effort to obtain his/her allocated catch. 
Catch shares generally slow the race to fish (ibid.). A slower fishing pace 
also promotes targeting of higher-quality fish that are sold fresh at better 
prices over a longer period of the season [46]. By making individual 
catch shares transferable, divisible, and permanent (i.e., ITQs), Grafton 
[28] argued that it is in the quota holders’ interest to preserve the fish 
stocks since larger stocks mean more profitability for the fishermen. 
Moreover, quota owners will experience that the market value of their 
quota holding depends on the biological yield of the stocks [26]. As 
transferable quotas significantly eliminate the common property prob-
lem of fisheries, ITQ systems have been widely adopted in various forms 
around the world the last decades [29]. 
2.1.3. Institutionally generated selling power 
By collaborating and organizing, economic actors can generate 
selling power [13]. The Norwegian Fishers’ Sales Organization of Her-
ring (in Norwegian: Norges Sildesalgslag) is a nationwide sales organi-
zation for pelagic fish species; primarily herring, mackerel, and blue 
whiting. The marketplace is owned and operated by Norwegian fishers. 
It is Europe’s largest auction for first-hand sales of pelagic fish [30]. The 
organization has power to set minimum prices and delivery and pay-
ment terms for the fish being sold. It also handles domestic and inter-
national marketing. About two million tons of pelagic fish is traded 
annually through Norges Sildesalgslag. This represents 2–2.5% of all 
wild fish sold in the world (ibid.). 
The Norwegian system of mandatory sales unions with monopoly 
power protected by law was invented during the economic crisis in the 
late 1930s. The unions have since survived and thrived, even in an era of 
increased globalization and market reforms. Experts have nevertheless 
questioned how effective monopolies can be in a neo-liberal world. 
2.1.4. Institutional barriers to entry: fishing license requirements 
Government policy can hinder entry into a fishery, e.g., by requiring 
a fishing license. If there are strong entry barriers in an industry, 
incumbent firms have a competitive advantage vis-à-vis outside firms. A 
new entrant will bring new catch capacity and a need for a share of the 
TAC, with the advantage being reflected in above economic perfor-
mance for those protected by barriers [13]. If there already is over-
capacity in the fishery, it will be reinforced [31]. A new entrant will also 
put pressure on quota prices and the rate of investment necessary to 
compete. The threat of entry, therefore, puts a cap on the profitability 
potential of a fishery. 
2.1.5. No extra tax reinforces the attractiveness of the industry for 
incumbent vessels 
The approach to capture and redistribute a fishery’s rent (influence 
rent and resource rent) to society will affect the industry attractiveness 
and thus the players’ prospect to reap extraordinary profit [19]. Inter-
nationally, there have been few attempts by governments to tax the rent 
from fisheries [29]. In 2004, Iceland introduced a fishing fee to cover 
management and enforcement costs [32]. However, it was soon 
increased to ensure that a share of the rent was being allocated to the 
public to encourage public support for the ITQ approach taken. New 
Zealand also initiated a resource rent tax, but it was abandoned [29]. 
Without redistribution, the rent from fisheries accrues primarily to the 
quota owners [33]. 
2.1.6. More on the relations between institutions and industry attractiveness 
Porter [12,13] claims that industry structure determines firms long- 
run profit potential. He argues that the strength of five competitive 
forces influence how the economic value created by the industry is 
divided between different stakeholders; that is how much is retained by 
firms in the industry versus that bargained away by customers and 
suppliers, limited by substitutes, or constrained by potential new en-
trants. Thus, the institutions included in Fig. 1 and discussed above are 
directly linked to the five forces as indicated in Table 1. 
In the case of renewable natural resource-based industries there may 
Table 1 
Institution-based influences on the five competitive forces that affect the 
attractiveness of a fishing industrya.  
Competitive force Institution-based influences 
Bargaining power of 
suppliers 
The supply is based on the biological production of 
fish. TACs are set by national governments or through 
international negotiations for shared stocks. TACs are 
distributed to domestic vessels by national authorities. 
Generally, vessels that could refer to a catch history 
were allocated quotas free of charge when quota 
systems were introduced. Commonly, vessels do not 
have to pay a resource tax on their catch. Accordingly, 
vessels that have not bought quotas pay nothing for the 
fish they catch. The bargaining power in relation to the 
supply of fish is in this case extremely good. 
Threat of new entrants In closed fisheries, there are normally substantial legal 
barriers to entry for example through requirements for 
fishing licenses and quotas. Entrants must also 
accommodate significant capital requirements related 
to investments in a vessel, gear, and quotas. 
Bargaining power of 
buyers and sellers 
By collaborating and organizing, economic actors can 
generate selling or buying power. In Norway, a 
processing plant is not allowed to integrate vertically 
toward the harvesting sector. This further strengthens 
the negotiating power of the vessels when selling their 
catch. 
Threat of substitutes Threat of substitutes is normally not influenced by 
formal institution-based arrangements. 
Rivalry among 
competitors 
An ITQ system provides an institutional protection of 
the vessels’ catch shares from their rivals. Moreover, it 
protects the incumbent vessels from outside intruders. 
Accordingly, the rivalry between the players is 
minimal.  
a Inspired by Porter’s five forces framework (1980, 2008), and Peng et al. 
[11]. 
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be a much stronger need for institutions to control the competitive forces 
at play, as uncontrolled exploitation may result in depletion of the stocks 
[1,2]. This has created a need for governments to step in and provide 
scientific advice on how much should be harvested, and what measures 
should be put in place to ensure that the TAC set will not be overfished 
[26]. The capacity adjustment can either be organized directly by the 
government through buy outs and similar schemes, or indirectly by the 
industry through the introduction of quota systems, and the setting up of 
a TAC will by itself not end the race to fish, and in most cases the ca-
pacity of the fishing fleet must be decreased [27]. There is thus a 
fundamental difference between the need for institutions in fisheries 
than in many other branches of economic activity. 
3. Institutional context 
In this chapter, the emergence and status of the institutional 
framework in Norwegian pelagic fishing is described. 
3.1. The pre-ITQ stage 
Before 1970, there were no capacity-reducing measures in the Nor-
wegian purse seine fleet [34]. However, the crisis led to a halt to the 
registration of purse seiners in 1970, the introduction of TAC for herring 
in 1971, and a hitherto unthinkable total ban on catching Atlantic 
herring in 1972 (Christensen, 2014). Moreover, during the seventies, 
more measures were introduced to reduce capacity through scrapping 
vessels, and the rules for permissible cargo volume were simultaneously 
liberalized, and, as a consequence, the reduction of total cargo capacity 
was significantly lower than indicated by the fewer vessels. Further-
more, public subsidies and natural retirement led to a decline in purse 
seiners from 460 vessels in 1967–115 in 1991. Finally, individual non- 
transferable vessel quotas (IVQ’s) were introduced in 1978 for purse 
seiners fishing capelin and extended in the late 1980s to include 
mackerel and herring. 
3.2. The unit quota system 
The IVQ system was modified in 1996 under the unit quota (UQ 
scheme) [35]. The aim was to reduce the number of vessels as the catch 
capacity still exceeded the available quota basis [4]. Moreover, the UQ’s 
were made tradable and a vessel owner was able to concentrate up to 
two quotas per vessel [34]. In 2000, the system was extended even 
further, allowing the merging of up to three quota factors per vessel. The 
measures were anchored to support a regional distribution profile since 
transfers from north to south resulted in a 40% quota cut while internal 
transfer within a region gave a reduction of 5% (north of Norway) or 
15% (south). 
3.3. The structural quota system 
In 2005, the UQ system was converted to a system with so-called 
“structure quotas” (SQ’s) as an additional measure to reduce catch ca-
pacity and increase efficiency. There was an effect on the number of 
purse seiners and in 2010 there were 84 vessels registered in the deep- 
sea pelagic fleet (ibid.). In this more flexible and market-oriented sys-
tem [36], the limited duration for the purchase of quotas was extended 
from 18 years to eternal ownership [34]. However, there was a change 
in government in Norway in 2006, and as a result permanent quotas 
were cancelled. Instead, quotas with duration of 25 years were given to 
vessels that had already benefited from the structure system. For future 
transactions, quotas with 20-year duration were granted [34]. 
Formally, Norway does not manage its fisheries by ITQ’s, but in re-
ality the fisheries management has many similarities with such a system 
(e.g. [36–38]). An ITQ-regime is based on a market logic where quota 
transactions act as an allocation mechanism between fishing vessels 
firms. Accordingly, it is the sole responsibility of the firms to adapt their 
quota basis to their catch capacity, as it is assumed that the firms act as 
rational actors that aim to maximize their profit from the given quota 
bases [28]. 
However, a profound criticism of the ITQ model is that the system 
leads to a strong concentration of quota ownership [39]. In addition, the 
system does not emphasise the importance of securing fish resources to 
geographical areas that are most dependent upon fisheries (ibid.) 
Accordingly, restrictions can be built into an ITQ regime to prevent the 
market from becoming the sole quota allocation mechanism. Many 
quota regimes, including Norway’s has features aimed at protecting the 
social structure and division of equity e.g. geographical restrictions on 
trade (see Table 2). Modifications include separate markets for different 
geographical areas (e.g. north/south), built in restrictions in terms of 
quota concentration per vessel (or vessel group), separate markets to 
ensure that a variety of adaptations coexist, and a require-ment that a 
fishing vessel firm must buy another vessel (which must be scrapped) 
with attached fishing rights in order to increase its own total quota share 
[34]. Key features of the structural quota system of Norwegian purse 
seiners are outlined in Table 2 as they appear in 2020. 
4. Data and methods 
4.1. Research design 
The research design of an empirical study, as outlined in this article, 
requires in-depth knowledge of the institutions embracing the compe-
tition arena and how these expectedly will shape the profit of the vessels. 
The design also requires valid and reliable profit measures. Finally, a 
dataset of representative vessels over a period covering the period before 
and after the introduction and long-term use of an ITQ-like management 
regime is required. In this context, a period of 34 years (1985–2018) is 
Table 2 
Key features of the structural quota system of Norwegian purse seiners.  
No Modification Justification  
1 The giving vessel has to be scrapped 
when quotas are transferred. 
Moreover, quotas can only be 
transferred between vessels in the 
same group. 
The responsibility for removing 
overcapacity in the industry is left to 
the actors themselves through the SQ 
system.  
2 When a quota is transferred in the 
purse seine vessel group, 5–40%, 
depending on the vessels’ 
homeports, is deducted from the 
transaction and re-allocated to the 
vessel group. 
To disincentivize quota transfers from 
certain geographic regions and 
resulting geographic concentration. 
Also to slow down the use of the 
mechanism.  
3 If the quota is traded from the 
northern region to the southern it 
will be reduced by 40%. If it is 
traded within the northern region, 
the reduction is 5% and 15% if the 
trade takes place within the 
southern region.   
4 Each vessel has a quota ceiling on 
850 tons at present, which 
represents approximately 2% of the 
vessel group’s TAC share. 
To prevent too high concentration of 
quotas on a few vessels.  
5 Each firm has a quota ceiling, 
which corresponds to 
approximately 6.5% of the vessel 
group’s TAC share. 
To avoid overconcentration of quotas 
on a few firms.  
6 Tradable quotas (structural quotas) 
are time limited. Upon expiration, 
in 2027 at the earliest, there is 
anticipation among industry actors 
that they will be allocated to the 
vessels remaining in the group, 
even though this is not formally yet 
determined. 
To express that the fish resources are a 
common property.  
7 Quota leasing is not permitted.  
*Adapted from Johnsen and Jentoft [7], and Standal and Asche [38] 
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considered sufficient to study how vessels have been able to make profit 
before and under two slightly different Norwegian ITQ systems. 
Focusing on one single industry makes it possible to control for industry 
impact, which, according to Porter [13], is crucial for firms’ profitability 
potential. 
4.2. Unit of analysis 
The vessel (seagoing purse seiner) is the unit of analysis in the pre-
sent study. The validity of the comparison of vessels’ profitability is 
highest when vessels are similar. This study, therefore, chose an industry 
of similar vessels, which is the Norwegian purse seiner fleet. All Nor-
wegian purse seiners are owned by active Norwegian fishers, as, ac-
cording to the Norwegian Participation Act (2013, §6), a fisherman must 
be actively fishing for at least three of the past five years to be allowed to 
own a fishing vessel. Further, to prevent concentration of quotas on a 
few vessels, there is a quota ceiling for each vessel at 850 tons at present, 
which represents approximately 2% of the TAC share [7]. The quota 
base of the largest vessel in the sample is approximately twice the quota 
base of the smallest. 
4.3. Sampling and data collection 
Fisheries management objectives generally include improving eco-
nomic performance. Nevertheless, vessel data to assess this are often 
unavailable as relatively few fisheries managers collect such informa-
tion, or they collect it only sporadically [40]. Accordingly, there must be 
sufficiently detailed longitudinal financial information available to 
measure the profit making of the vessels. This information must also be 
available for a sufficient number of vessels to ensure statistical validity 
of the conclusions. The Norwegian Directorate of Fisheries requires most 
fish shipping companies to report income and cost data annually per 
vessel. This study has gained access to this unique dataset and bases all 
its analysis on it. 
4.4. Measuring profitability 
The aim of the present study is to explore the profit making of fishing 
vessels over time before and under ITQ-like regimes. The chosen 34-year 
period first covers the period before the implementation of transferable 
quotas in the Norwegian pelagic fisheries (1985–1995). The profitability 
of this pre-intervention phase is then compared to the profitability of the 
vessels under two different intervention phases. The first intervention 
phase covers the period 1996–2004 when the UQ system was in oper-
ation, while the second intervention phase covers the period 2005–2018 
when the SQ system has been at work. 
It is of particular interest to study vessels’ profit making in a popu-
lation like this, because the adaptation process to the new regimes is not 
necessarily rapid, and the profitability effects may not be quickly visible. 
In such a setting, there is a need for a long-term study as prospects of 
uncovering the magnitude of the profit making that has taken place will 
then be better. The strength of the institutional forces (see Fig. 1 and 
Table 1) affects prices, costs, and investments required to operate; thus, 
the forces are directly tied to the income statements of the industry 
participants [12,13]. Accordingly, it is average profit margins over this 
period, not profitability in any particular year, which is the focus of 
analysis. 
The book value of assets is not available in comparable format for the 
total time series. Book value of assets from 2003 onwards cannot be 
reliably compared to values before 2003. Cost and income statements 
are more comparable and reliable over time and will be used in this 
study from 1985. This has the consequence that return figures, where 
assets are included in formulas, are not available. However, return fig-
ures based on cost and income statements are available, and three such 
measures will be presented (see Table 3). Operating margin is the most 
common measure. Cash flow margin is cash flow from operations 
divided by operating revenues. Finally, the study includes net profit 
margin. Net profit is operating result less net interests paid. Net profit 
margin is calculated relative to revenues. 
All financial results are reported before taxes. The main reason is that 
income tax rate for Norway has changed over the period of study. At the 
start, the nominal tax rate was 27%. From around 2010 the tax rate 
declined, and last year of our study had a tax rate of 22%. After-tax 
calculations would therefore report better returns late in the period 
due to tax issues rather than due to changes in ITQ regimes. In addition, 
before-tax calculations will make the results from this study easier to 
compare with similar results from other countries with different tax 
regimes. 
5. Empirical findings 
This section presents the empirical findings of the study starting with 
the RQ raised: 
RQ: Is the profitability development of the Norwegian average 
seagoing purse seiner related to the implementation of the original UQ 
system and the later more liberal SQ system? 
Table 4 provides a summary of average profitability margins for the 
sample of seagoing vessels under study covering the period 1985–2018. 
The table is split into three different sub periods reflecting that the vessel 
quota system was implemented in two different stages. In the first sub 
period covering 1985–1995, non-transferable IVQs were in operation in 
Norway. This is the pre-intervention stage. This period is then followed 
by two other sub periods with consecutive institutional interventions. 
Table 3 
Profitability margins applied in this study.  
Operating margin Operating margin is the standard measure for return on 
revenue. Operating profit is normally identified by the 
acronym EBIT (Earnings Before Interest and Taxes). 
Arguments for exclusion of taxes has already been discussed. 
Interest are also excluded at this level, as interests paid is 
influenced by the amount of debt taken on, and the current 
interest rate of debt. Financing issues on the level of 
individual vessels is of all likelihood not related to differences 
in quota regimes. Annual depreciations and amortizations is 
included as a cost item in EBIT. 
Cash flow margin Cash flow margin is measured as EBITDA (an acronym for 
Earnings Before Interest, Taxes, Depreciations, and 
Amortizations). The difference between EBIT and EBITDA is 
thus depreciations and amortizations. As depreciations and 
amortizations are not cash flow items, EBITDA will measure 
cash flow gained from operational activity. This is a much 
used item for calculation of free cash flow. 
Net profit margin Net profit (before taxes) is EBIT less interest paid, and thus the 
effect of financing and varying interest rates on debt will 
influence the item. Nonetheless, it reveals profitability for 
owner of vessels. Negative Net profit inevitably will lead to 
negative rate of return on equity, and vise-versa for positive 
Net profit. EBIT will always be larger or equal to net profit 
(equal if debt or cost of debt is zero). The difference illustrates 
the influence of cost of debt on net profit. 
Relations between 
the terms 
All three margins calculated are relevant in comparing 
profitability. Operating margin indicates the size of revenues 
that could be distributed to all investors (debt holders and 
equity owners) for a firm that reinvests similar amounts over 
time as accumulated annual depreciations. Cash flow margin 
is always larger than operating margin, and may be seen as 
operating results where reinvestment in new assets is similar 
to current assets. Net profit margin represents the owner’s 
point of view: a negative net profit margin tells that he/she is 
actually loosing value of his/her investment. A positive net 
profit margin is indicative of, but not the same as, return on 
equity. Net profit margin is always less than operating 
margin. The difference shows how the result is distributed 
between debt holder and equity owner. As debt holders have 
priority over equity holders for available cash flow, net profit 
margin may demonstrate the real financial variability over 
time for owners of purse seiners.  
B.A. Bertheussen and T. Vassdal                                                                                                                                                                                                            
Marine Policy 123 (2021) 104286
6
The sub period 1996–2004, when the UQ system was in operation, 
represents the first intervention. Finally, the sub period from 2005 to 
2018 when the more liberal SQ system was at work represents the sec-
ond institutional intervention. 
In the pre-intervention phase, average profit margin was 8.8%, 
average cash flow margin was 19.5%, and average net profit margin was 
− 3.5%. It is worth noting that the net profit margin was negative in the 
first eight years of this period, which marks the end of the subsidization 
of Norwegian fisheries [5]. 
In the first intervention phase, the UQ system was introduced. 
Average profit margin, cash flow margin, and net profit margin then 
make a significant leap to 20.6%, 32.2%, and 14.7% (p < 0.000), 
respectively. 
The average profitability margins continue to increase also after the 
SQ system is introduced (intervention 2), to 24.3%, 37.3%, and 19.0%, 
respectively, but these increases are not significant compared to similar 
values in the previous period (p = 0.068). 
In the pre-intervention phase, all three margins show a growing 
trend, while they are surprisingly stable within each of the two inter-
vention phases. The best years in financial terms were 2011 and 2016. 
6. Discussion 
Institutions are commonly known as the “rules of the game” [9], and, 
in the literature, there is a remarkable consensus that institutions matter 
[11]. How they matter and to what extent they matter when it comes to 
profitability in fisheries is, however, underreported [19]. Norwegian 
fisheries are managed by and through institutions [5–7]. This paper 
initially explored theoretically how institutions such as TAC and ITQ 
regulations together with legal barriers to entry have the potential to 
influence the economic attractiveness of fishing industries for incum-
bent firms and thus their profitability prospects (see Fig. 1 and Table 1). 
Next, the paper empirically examined the long-term relationship be-
tween profitability of fishing vessels before and under different quota 
interventions such as the Norwegian ITQ variants represented by the UQ 
and SQ systems. The sample investigated constituted more than half of 
the population of Norwegian seagoing pelagic fishing vessels, which 
were followed from 1985 to 2018 (see Table 4). 
The RQ raised in the introduction section of the paper was: “Is the 
profitability development of the Norwegian average seagoing purse 
seiner related to the implementation of the original UQ system and the 
later more liberal SQ system?” Table 4 summarizes the average 
Table 4 











Pre-ITQ stage: Non-transferable vessel quotas (the IVQ 
system) 
1985  126  67 1.6% 11.9% − 9.3% 
1986  106  49 7.4% 17.0% − 5.9% 
1987  91  42 4.7% 16.5% − 11.2% 
1988  83  38 9.9% 22.1% − 3.7% 
1989  86  44 11.4% 22.7% − 2.5% 
1990  90  47 2.2% 16.0% − 13.4% 
1991  88  43 11.7% 20.6% − 2.4% 
1992  95  44 11.0% 21.3% − 3.3% 
1993  94  45 11.7% 21.8% 1.5% 
1994  96  32 10.2% 20.0% 3.1% 
1995  98  38 14.9% 24.3% 8.8% 
The first ITQ variant in operation (the UQ system) 1996  95  44 21.4% 31.2% 18.0% 
1997  104  36 23.2% 31.9% 19.8% 
1998  91  78 19.9% 29.9% 16.2% 
1999  95  65 18.5% 30.4% 11.2% 
2000  95  79 13.9% 26.8% 5.2% 
2001  91  76 27.2% 37.2% 21.3% 
2002  93  81 25.7% 36.6% 18.7% 
2003  89  74 14.7% 31.0% 4.9% 
2004  86  66 20.7% 35.3% 16.6% 
The second ITQ variant in operation (the SQ system) 2005  85  72 25.9% 38.2% 22.3% 
2006  84  63 22.5% 35.1% 19.0% 
2007  81  61 21.4% 32.7% 20.8% 
2008  80  70 22.7% 36.3% 9.3% 
2009  79  65 20.9% 35.9% 19.1% 
2010  78  66 27.8% 38.8% 24.3% 
2011  80  65 35.0% 44.2% 30.3% 
2012  75  58 24.3% 37.1% 19.1% 
2013  73  57 19.6% 34.0% 11.6% 
2014  73  60 18.4% 33.2% 11.6% 
2015  74  58 21.7% 36.0% 13.7% 
2016  73  61 29.8% 42.4% 27.2%  
2017  72  56 23.3% 37.5% 15.7%  








(1986–1995)     
8.8% 19.5% − 3.5% 
Averaged UQ intervention 
(1996–2004)     
20.6% 32.2% 14.7% 
Averagee SQ intervention 
(2005–2016)     
24.3% 37.3% 19.0%  
a EBIT/Revenue before taxes 
b EBITDA/Revenue before taxes 
c EBIT-Net interest/Revenue before taxes 
d A paired t-test showed significant difference between period 1 and period 2 (p < 0.000) 
e A paired t-test did not show a significant difference between period 2 and period 3 (p = 0.068) 
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profitability margins of the vessels during the 34-year study period. 
Moreover, the table is split into three different sub periods reflecting a 
pre-intervention phase (1985–1995), the first intervention phase when 
the UQ system was in operation (1996–2004), and finally the second 
intervention phase represented by the SQ system (2005–2018). 
The figures draw a picture of an industry where the profit margins 
improve considerably over time. However, the average vessel made a 
loss in the period before the quota systems were introduced with a net 
profit margin of − 3.5%. This negative financial outcome is in stark 
contrast to both quota intervention periods that provided profit margins 
of plus 14.7% and plus 19.0%, respectively. The profitability between 
the pre-intervention phase and the UQ intervention and the pre- 
intervention phase and the SQ intervention was significantly different 
(p < 0.000). However, there was no significant difference in profit-
ability between the UQ intervention and the SQ intervention 
(p = 0.068). Accordingly, the findings of this study support the claim 
made in the theoretical framework developed that the economic 
attractiveness of a fishing industry is influenced by its institutional 
environment. Institutions that provide exclusive rights to vessels to 
harvest a valuable and common fish resource for free have established a 
very good foundation for profitable operations of the players, as illus-
trated by Table 4. These results are also supportive of the findings of 
Bertheussen and Vassdal [19] and Flaaten et al. [33]. 
An interesting question is, which institution is the most important 
and why? In order to fully understand the impacts on profitability, it is 
desirable to have data before and after the introduction of each of the 
institutions discussed in this paper (see Section 2.1). However, time 
series that extend over many decades are hard to obtain. This study 
argues that TAC is the most important institution in a commercial 
fishery as it ensures that there is a biological production to distribute 
among the business actors [2]. Without TAC regulations, a stock is at risk 
of collapsing, and Norwegian herring fishing in the 1950s and 1960s 
before the introduction of TAC is an example of this (see Section 3.1). 
To maximize the economic value of the biological production that 
takes place, the pelagic fishers in Norway have established their own 
sales organization to prevent the buyers from seizing a disproportion-
ately large share of the values being created [30]. The purpose of a TAC 
and institutionally generated selling power is therefore the same; to 
maximize the value creation for the catch sector all together. Eventually, 
the players can cooperate politically to prevent part of the value creation 
from being seized by society in the form of a resource rent tax [29]. 
However, even if large aggregate economic values are created, there 
is a risk that the players will invest so much in overcapacity to secure the 
largest possible share of the value creation taking place that fishing will 
be unprofitable for each individual vessel [27]. One purpose of intro-
ducing ITQs and barriers to entry is precisely to protect the profitability 
of incumbent vessels against destructive rivalry. 
It is methodologically challenging to determine how much each in-
dividual institution contributes to the profitability of the players and 
accordingly determine which is most important, with variations in 
profitability also being a result of the fact that the various business ac-
tors are not evenly skilled when it comes to utilizing the biological, 
institutional, and other environmental opportunities offered in a fishery 
(Bertheusssen and Vassdal, 2019). The bottom line of the firms’ accounts 
only uncovers the overall effect of the various institutions on 
profitability. 
6.1. Implications 
To prevent fisheries policy decisions creating arbitrary and unin-
tended consequences, the decision making should be based on a 
knowledge base where the connections between causes and effects are 
known. In their recent evaluation of the quota system, The Norwegian 
National Audit Office [41] emphasizes that it is highly reprehensible 
that the consequences of various fisheries policy changes in Norway 
have not been sufficiently studied and known before the measures have 
been implemented. Accordingly, the National Audit Office recommends 
the Ministry of Trade and Industry to ensure that future changes in the 
quota system are thoroughly assessed before being implemented. The 
National Audit Office therefore demands that future fisheries policy 
decisions should be based on known causal relationships. 
The liberalization of the Norwegian quota system that took place in 
2005 has led to further a quota concentration both geographically and in 
terms of ownership, according to the Norwegian National Audit Office 
[41]. This is an outcome which is not in line with official Norwegian 
fisheries policy ([41]). According to this study, the non-significant 
profitability improvement that has taken place at vessel level since 
2005 (see Table 4) may therefore have been a high price to pay to 
challenge the aforementioned established fisheries policy objectives. 
The present study contributes theoretically to the strategy field by 
not only embracing the proposition that “institutions matter” but also by 
pushing forward to explore how much institutions matter in a business 
economic sense. Accordingly, the tentative theoretical framework 
depicted in Fig. 1 and further outlined in Table 1 indicates how related 
institutional variables have the potential to affect the economic attrac-
tiveness of natural resource-based industries, such as the Norwegian 
pelagic fishing industry. Moreover, this study demonstrates that under 
the aforementioned institutional environment, fishing vessels have been 
able to operate profitably in the long-term (1996–2018). A second 
contribution is that the study illustrates clearly how rapidly firms’ 
profitability improved after the implementation of institutional changes 
and regulatory shifts by comparing the profitability margins in the pre- 
intervention phase with the margins of the first intervention phase in 
Table 4. The present study argues that the competitive forces in a fishing 
industry can be influenced by underlying institutions (see Fig. 1 and 
Table 1) and thus substantially affect profitability (see Table 4) of the 
vessels over time, with defending against threats imposed by competi-
tive forces in an industry and exploiting opportunities arising when the 
forces are at play being crucial to business strategy [13]. Understanding 
the institutional influence of the industry structure is also essential for a 
firm to position itself favorably in a quota market such as the Norwegian 
one. 
Industry profitability has been remarkably persistent in the cohort of 
the present study after the introduction of the first transferable vessel 
quota system in 1996. However, the industry structure is constantly 
undergoing modest adjustment, and it can occasionally change abruptly 
[13]. Shifts in the structure may originate from outside or within an 
industry. The shifts can boost or reduce the industry’s profit potential. 
Shifts may be caused by institutional changes, changes in technology or 
customer needs, or other unforeseen events such as the ongoing coro-
navirus pandemic crisis that suddenly paralyzed many businesses all 
over the world. To reduce unsystematic business risk, a fishing vessel 
firm can develop into other industries by means of funds earned in the 
core industry [42]. 
6.2. Limitations and future studies 
To verify the causality between financial performance of the vessels 
and ITQ regulations, a comparative future study could be applied. For 
example, a study can investigate whether there are differences in the 
ITQ regulation for purse seiners and other types of vessels in Norway. If 
the answer is yes, the study may compare the financial performance of 
the different vessel groups. Another study could compare the ITQ 
regulation for Norway and other countries. In the end, the studies could 
derive policy implications, e.g., how to enhance financial performance 
by improving the ITQ regulation and the underlying institutional fea-
tures in Norway and other countries. 
Furthermore, a future study that measure the adaptation process of 
the ITQ regulation, for example changes in the vessel capacity as a result 
of quota transferred, could probably separate the contribution of ITQ to 
financial performance after controlling for other factors such as total 
quotas and exchange rates. 
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Finally, in 1990, a uniform system of ITQs covering almost all fish-
eries in Iceland was established. Over time, the ITQ system leads to 
increased profitability, especially in the processing component [43]. As 
a result, the Icelandic fishing industry is now paying a significant fishing 
fee [32,44,45]. The present study focused on pelagic vessels only. A 
future study may discuss how institutional features affect the profit-
ability of the pelagic processing industry. 
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